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Abstract
Achieving competitive advantage and price premiums in many technology-based markets requires the incorporation
of current technology in new products. To do so, ﬁrms in hyper-competitive environments increasingly plan and design
their products concurrent with the independent development and validation of underlying technologies. Simultaneous
validation of a core technology has important implications for a companys product positioning and launch sequence
decisions making these traditional marketing decisions relevant to operations managers. Prior research has shown that
to minimize cannibalization in the absence of such improvements in technology, a ﬁrm should not launch low-end
products before high-end products. However, concurrent evolution of technology can make it desirable and even
necessary to introduce low-end products before high-end products. This is because in technology-based industries,
improvements in technology delay the introduction of a high-end product, and a ﬁrm must trade-oﬀ the beneﬁt of
launching the low-end product earlier (greater discounted proﬁts) against the cost of cannibalization of high-end
product sales. High-end product cannibalization can be further reduced by oﬀering the customer an option to upgrade
from the low-end to high-end product, with important implications for the ﬁrms product positioning and introduction
sequence decisions. Based on our study in the high technology industry, we model the product positioning and in-
troduction sequence decisions under the simultaneous evolution of technology. Our analysis indicates that it may be
optimal in a variety of circumstances for a ﬁrm to launch products in an increasing order of performance, even in the
absence of network externalities. Besides presenting analytical results for product positioning and proﬁt from diﬀerent
introduction sequences, the paper also makes a contribution to managerial practice by providing insights in the form of
a conceptual framework.
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1. Introduction
Leading ﬁrms in the personal computer (PC) industry such as Dell and Compaq have lately been an-
nouncing the introduction of their new higher-performance products on the same day their processor
supplier (Intel) announces the introduction of its higher-performance microprocessor technology to the
market. This is achieved by the computer ﬁrms developing their products concurrently with the develop-
ment and validation of microprocessors at Intel. Due to the technological challenges involved in developing
processors, Intel introduces the processor technology in an increasing order of performance: beginning with
slower microprocessors in a new family (such as Pentium), and gradually evolving to a higher performance
technology (see Fig. 1). This sequential upward progression is also reﬂected in the introduction of computer
products and other high-technology peripherals (such as hard drives, digital signal processors, and even
software). However, this recent trend is contrary to the pattern observed in other industries such as books,
movies, automobiles and even PCs in the 1980s. As Moorthy and Png (1992) note, book publishers in-
troduce hardcover books before paperbacks, and IBM released its lower-performance PS/1 several years
after the introduction of its higher-end PS/2 system.
The rationale for delaying low-end products is to minimize the cannibalization of the high-end products,
and was the thrust of the discussion in the pioneering work of Moorthy and Png (1992). However, the
recent trend in the high-technology industry of introducing products in an increasing order of performance
(low-end products before high-end) indicates that additional (operational) factors may be at work in
making the product introduction decision. In particular, the concurrent development of technology places
operational limits on the earliest time by which a high-end product can be introduced. In such cases, de-
laying the low-end product may minimize cannibalization of the high-end product, but also would lower
the discounted proﬁt accruing to the ﬁrm. This is the one of the marketing-operations trade-oﬀs that we
model in the paper to determine the proﬁt maximizing product positioning and introduction sequence.
One approach a ﬁrm may use to mitigate cannibalization of high-end product is to design the product so
as to oﬀer the customer the option to upgrade from the low-end product to high-end product. Such a design
approach ensures that customers with the highest valuation for performance can enjoy the low-end product
earlier and then upgrade to the high-end product as soon as it is available. The ﬁrm can also earn a greater
proﬁt by charging the customer a premium for the upgrade. As we observe in the paper, the upgrade option
however changes the optimal product location and the level of market coverage oﬀered by the ﬁrm.
Fig. 1. Intels technology introduction sequence for 1999–2000 (from: http://channel.intel.com/business/iachan/micinfo/desktop/
tdroadmap.htm).
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Product positioning and introduction sequence decisions are particularly important to ﬁrms that develop
technology-based products such as PCs and telecommunication devices. The evolution in time of the
performance of the underlying technology (for example microprocessors) determines how early the product
of a certain performance level can be introduced to the market. In this context, the research questions that
we address in this paper are as follows:
(I) How should a ﬁrm facing exogenous technology improvements and designing products concurrently
with the evolving technology determine the performance levels, target market segments, and order of
introduction for its products?
(II) What impact does oﬀering the consumer the option to upgrade have on the above decisions?
(III) How do declining prices under competition inﬂuence product positioning and introduction sequence?
How should two competing ﬁrms determine the performance levels and prices of their products?
Positioning and introduction sequence decisions have been studied by several economics and marketing
researchers including Mussa and Rosen (1978), Spence (1980), and Moorthy (1984). Spence (1980) deals
with the positioning of a product family in a market with quantity-dependent pricing, but does not consider
the issues of diﬀerent launch sequences or technology improvement over time. Mussa and Rosen (1978) and
Moorthy (1984) address the issues of product positioning and market segmentation, by considering the
tradeoﬀ between an increased unit variable cost for products of higher performance and the higher margins
that high-end customers would be willing to pay. However, they do not model the sequence of introduction,
instead they assume all products are launched simultaneously. Wilson and Norton (1989) address the
timing of introduction of a new product extension considering the degree of diﬀusion of the previous
generation and ﬁnding the optimal launch timing based on margins, however our approach relies on
segmenting the same market while minimizing the impact of cannibalization. Dhebar (1994) identiﬁes the
conditions for the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria for diﬀerent launch sequences, but does not
consider the dynamics of technology improvement and its eﬀects on the introduction sequence.
Moorthy and Png (1992) present an insightful model of the trade-oﬀs underlying launch sequence de-
cisions. They compare the merits of sequential and simultaneous launch for a market with two customer
segments of pre-speciﬁed sizes and with no exogenous improvements in technology. It is therefore possible
to launch both the higher-end and lower-end product simultaneously at any given period, however doing
so would cannibalize the demand for the higher-end product. While it is optimal to introduce high-end
products before low-end products when cannibalization is strong, it is not desirable under the framework of
their model to ever launch the low-end product before the high-end product. Because we consider oper-
ational issues of products being developed based on a concurrently-evolving technology, it is not possible to
launch the product of a certain level of performance before a certain period of time (when the technology
necessary is available). Under these conditions, we ﬁnd that introducing products in an increasing order of
performance may be optimal in a range of situations (complementing the result of Padmanabhan et al.
(1997)). Our model is also more general than that of Moorthy and Png (1992) in that we consider a general
distribution of customer preferences. We also do not assume the existence of two segments of known sizes,
instead the market segments and their sizes are explicitly derived from our model. However, we do follow
the tradition of Moorthy and Png (1992) and other economics research in assuming in many cases that a
ﬁrm can credibly commit to the launch and performance levels of higher-end products. This reﬂects the
product development trend in the high-technology industry, where PC ﬁrms set a schedule of product
launch based on Intels processor launch plans. We also analyze some special cases where no credible
commitment may be issued by the ﬁrm, and study the impact on the positioning of the products.
Recently, there has been considerable work on the operational issues surrounding product development
decisions (Joglekar, 1999). Ahmadi and Wang (1999) model the design interdependence issues facing the
rationalization of product development processes. Kim and Chhajed (2000) present an interesting model to
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illustrate the cost-saving beneﬁts of a common component using a model structure similar to that of
Moorthy and Png (1992). Smith and Eppinger (1997) study the dynamics of design iterations and show how
they can be analytically formulated. Thomke and Bell (2001) model the trade-oﬀ between the cost of
prototyping and the cost of re-design to derive optimal policies for prototyping in product development.
Based on our study of the high-technology industry, we present a model that integrates operational and
marketing factors such as performance improvement over time, cannibalization, diverse consumer valua-
tions, ﬁrm and consumer discounting, and competitive assessment. The model formulation helps us identify
analytical results for optimal product performances, prices, and target market segments. We also charac-
terize the domain of appropriateness of diﬀerent orders of introduction (such as sequentially increasing
order of performance, sequentially decreasing order of performance or simultaneous introduction). Based
on the model results, we present a managerial framework to provide a summary of the model insights. One
interesting ﬁnding of this work is that introducing products in an increasing order of performance is de-
sirable when the performance of products can be improved by adopting concurrently evolving technology.
We also ﬁnd that designing the product to oﬀer customers the upgrade option increases the domain of
optimality of sequential upward introduction. When providing the upgrade option, if a ﬁrm intends to oﬀer
an upgrade to the customers later, it is better not to pre-announce the product. However, if the ﬁrm does
not intend to introduce the upgrade, it is better to pre-announce the high-end product, so that some
consumers will wait for the high-end product to be introduced, and pay the higher margins associated with
the high-end product. Under a duopoly, the approach of sequential upward introduction again becomes
even more attractive. We also obtain interesting results for the market share and proﬁt of two competing
ﬁrms in a duopolistic environment, with the low-end ﬁrm increasing its proﬁt and the high-end ﬁrm facing a
decrease in its proﬁt compared to the monopoly situation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the model conceptualization and formulation in
Section 2. In Section 3, we present analytical results for the monopoly case when the customer does not
have the option to upgrade to a higher-performance product. In Section 4, we analyze both the eﬀect of
oﬀering the customer an option to upgrade and a competitive environment on the ﬁrms product posi-
tioning and introduction sequence decisions. After proposing a conceptual framework to summarize the
insights from the model in Section 4, we conclude in Section 5 with the strengths and limitations of the
model, and avenues for future research.
2. Model setting and conceptualization
We discuss the model conceptualization and assumptions in this section. For ease of exposition, we begin
by describing a monopolistic environment.
The ﬁrm that is our focus is planning the development and launch of a technology-based product, which
is assumed to be diﬀerentiated along a single attribute (a primary dimension, for example processor speed in
the case of computers) referred to as performance quality. We denote the performance quality level of
product i on this dimension by qi. For the analysis in Section 3, we assume that consumers buy just one
product, and leave the market after purchase. In Section 4, we consider the case where consumers who buy
the product at a given time would be interested in upgrading to a higher performance product at a later
period.
The performance of the product is realized using an exogenous underlying technology T that is being
concurrently developed. Due to this concurrent development, the maximum performance level that the
product can deliver improves with time (see Fig. 2). Therefore, our model of product development eﬀort
extends through the life-cycle of the core technology. As described in Section 1, the ﬁrm makes decisions on
the performance levels of individual products and their sequence of introduction. Because the precise timing
of introduction is not as much of a focus as the insights on the relative order of introduction of the
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products, we use a simple multi-period model of product introduction. We ﬁrst model the case where the
ﬁrm introduces only two products, one at a lower performance level and another at a higher performance
level, referred to as the low-end product and high-end product, respectively.
We model the unit variable cost of the product to be an increasing and convex function of the products
performance quality qi. In other words, the marginal cost of delivering higher performance increases with
the level of performance. Speciﬁcally, we assume the unit cost of product i to be independent of demand
volume and is given by cq2i , where c is a constant. This form of the unit cost oﬀers the added beneﬁt of
tractability, and is also used in the literature (Moorthy, 1984; Moorthy and Png, 1992). We also assume
that the ﬁxed costs of developing products are negligibly small compared to the gross proﬁt, since the
products are introduced in the mass market.
To model demand, we assume consumers to be rational in that they purchase the product with a per-
formance level that maximizes their net utility surplus. Owing to diﬀerences in needs, perception of per-
formance, and extent of usage of the product, diﬀerent consumers value a unit of performance diﬀerently,
which we model in a fashion similar to established literature (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Spence, 1980;
Moorthy and Png, 1992). Each consumer has a certain valuation of performance, denoted by v, which is the
amount the consumer is willing to pay for a unit of performance. For product i which has a performance
quality of qi, a customer with a valuation of v is willing to pay a maximum of vqi. If a consumer has a higher
valuation for performance, s/he would gain more utility, and would be willing to pay more for a unit of
product performance. The linear form of consumer utility is commonly used in the literature, because it
enables a simpler analysis of consumer choice. The surplus that a consumer with valuation v derives from a
product of performance quality qi is given by vqi  pi, where pi is the price of the product. Let F ðvÞ denote
the cumulative number of consumers with valuation less than or equal to v, and let the mass density
function of the valuation v be given by the distribution function f ðvÞ. 1 We assume that f ðvÞ and F ðvÞ are
known a priori to the ﬁrm.
The surplus derived by the consumer from a product is also a function of the time of consumption, as a
product oﬀered earlier provides greater utility than a product with the same performance oﬀered later. In
other words, consumers discount the surplus accrued from a product at the rate of dc; the discounted
surplus from product i introduced in period n to a consumer with a valuation of v is given by dncðvqi  piÞ.
The ﬁrm too prefers early accrual of proﬁts, and it discounts proﬁts from products at a rate of ds.
As is the case in the high technology industry, we model that the ﬁrm communicates the roadmap of its
products (timing of introduction and the performance levels of the products) to its consumers. We also
assume in some sections that this announcement is credible, i.e., consumers will wait to purchase the
product that is introduced later if their discounted surplus from that product is higher. This ensures that
there exists subgame-perfect equilibria, i.e., the later product is launched at a performance level q and price
p that is expected by the customer (Dhebar, 1994). For some special cases for the distribution of the
consumer valuations, we analyze the positioning problem where a credible announcement cannot be made.
Fig. 2. Constraint on maximum deliverable performance.
1 We assume here that v has a continuous distribution over the entire market. Since the product family is designed for the mass
market, this is a reasonable assumption.
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The concurrent development of the core technology means that (a) highest deliverable performance
of products increases over time, and (b) certain high levels of technology may not be available earlier in
time and higher performance products must wait until the appropriate level of technology becomes
available.
The operational issues surrounding product availability is modeled in this paper by constraining the
earliest period in which the high-end product can be introduced. For our analysis with two products, we use
a three-period model, in which the high-end product can be introduced no earlier than the second period,
while the low-end product can be introduced as early as the ﬁrst period. If the ﬁrm introduces products in a
sequentially downward fashion (delaying the low-end product by a period to limit cannibalization), it can
introduce the low-end product only in the third period after the launch of the high-end product in the
second period. Table 1 shows product availability for the three introduction approaches: (1) upward se-
quential introduction (low-end product followed by high-end), (2) downward sequential introduction (high-
end product followed by low-end), and (3) simultaneous introduction of both products.
It is evident from the above table that upward sequential introduction leads to early accrual of proﬁt, but
also results in increased cannibalization of the high-end product. When a low-end product is introduced
early in the market, the ﬁrm has to ensure that it does not cannibalize the sales of the high-end product to a
large extent, and the ﬁrm can reduce the extent of cannibalization by pricing the two products appropri-
ately, and diﬀerentiating the products in terms of performance quality levels. When the ﬁrm and the
consumer discount their proﬁts and utilities respectively at diﬀerent rates, the proﬁts and the costs of
cannibalization can be manipulated appropriately, depending on the rates of discounting used by the ﬁrm
and the consumers. In our analyses, we incorporate these factors to identify the regions where each of the
three sequential introduction strategies are optimal, and provide insights for the ﬁrm for planning the
product development process. The three introduction sequences are analyzed in the next section to derive
expressions for performance quality levels and ﬁrm proﬁtability.
3. Model formulation and solution for a two-product family
We now present the detailed model formulation and solution when the family consists of two products.
In this section, we assume that the ﬁrm can make a credible announcement about the relative performances
of the two products. The performance and price of the low-end product are denoted by q1 and p1; re-
spectively, and that of the high-end product are denoted by q2 and p2. Since consumers with higher val-
uations of performance are willing to pay more for a product, the ﬁrm targets the higher-end product at
these consumers. Consumers with lower valuations of performance either adopt the low-end product, or do
not purchase any product. We also assume that all consumers will purchase just one product (this as-
sumption is relaxed when the upgrade option is oﬀered). The two market segments are characterized by the
variables v1 and v2 (see Fig. 3), whose signiﬁcance is as follows:
• Consumers with a valuation lower than v1 do not buy any of the products, as the utility viqi they derive
from a product is less than pi, the price of the product.
Table 1
Operational aspects of product availability using diﬀerent introduction sequences
Introduction sequence Period I Period II Period III
Upward sequential introduction Low-end product High-end product
Downward sequential introduction High-end product Low-end product
Simultaneous introduction Low-end product; High-end product
S. Bhattacharya et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 149 (2003) 102–130 107
• Consumers with valuations between v1 and v2 buy the low-end product, as they get a higher surplus from
the low-end product than the high-end product.
• Consumers with valuations higher than v2 derive the maximum surplus from the high-end product, and
consequently buy the higher end product. 2
The demand volume for the low-end product is simply F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ, as every customer whose valuation
lies between v1 and v2 purchases the low-end product. Similarly, the demand volume for the high-end
product is given by 1 F ðv2Þ. The proﬁt maximization problem for the three introduction approaches in
Table 1 can be formulated mathematically as Problem TP.
Problem TP
MaxP ¼ cs½fF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þgðp1  cq21Þ þ ls½f1 F ðv2Þgðp2  cq22Þ
such that:
ccðvq1  p1ÞP lcðvq2  p2Þ; v16 v < v2 ð1Þ
ccðvq1  p1Þ6 lcðvq2  p2Þ; v2 < v61 ð2Þ
vq1  p1 P 0; v16 v6 v2 ð3Þ
vq2  p2 P 0; v2 < v61 ð4Þ
The objective function P (ﬁrms proﬁt) is the sum of two terms representing the contributions from the low-
end product and the high-end product. The proﬁt of each product is equal to the demand volume multiplied
by the margin (which is equal to p  cq2), and is discounted by factors cs andls which correspond re-
spectively to the period of introduction of the low-end and high-end product, respectively. Constraints 1
and 2 are the self-selection constraints, which ensure that the consumers select (get more surplus from) the
products targeted at them. Constraints 3 and 4 are the participation constraints, and they ensure that the
utility that the consumers obtain from the product is positive. cc and lc are the appropriate consumer
discounting factors for the utilities derived from the low-end product and high-end product, respectively.
These and the ﬁrm discounting factors are based on the period of introduction, for example, if the low-end
product is introduced in the ﬁrst period, cs, and cc are equal to 1.
3.1. Model analytical solution
In this section, we characterize the optimal solution when consumer valuations have general distribu-
tions. The analytical solution uses the notion of the marginal consumer (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Besanko
and Winston, 1990). Consumers with valuations of v1 and v2 in Fig. 3 are the marginal consumers in the
market, as they are indiﬀerent between the two options that they have. The consumer with a valuation of v1
for performance is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying the low-end product, and the consumer with
Fig. 3. Consumer valuations who adopt each of two products.
2 The reason for such a market structure is as follows. Consumers with very low valuations of quality (low v) will not be willing to
pay for either product as their reservation price, given by vq, is low. If a consumer with a valuation of v1 buys the low-end product, then
a consumer with a higher valuation (who derives greater utility) will also buy the low-end product. Consumers with very high
valuations of quality will buy the high-end product even if it is more expensive, because the excess utility from quality vðq2  q1Þ is
higher than the diﬀerence in the prices of the products p2  p1.
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a valuation of v2 is indiﬀerent between buying the low-end product and the high-end product. Equat-
ing the utilities of the marginal from their two options gives us the optimal prices. From Eqs. (1)–(3), we
obtain
p1 ¼ v1q1
p2 ¼ v2q2  cclc
ðv2  v1Þq1
Thus the surplus of the lower-end marginal consumer (with a valuation of v1) equals zero, since s/he is the
customer with the lowest valuation to buy the product. p2 is obtained by setting the utility of the higher-end
marginal consumer (with a valuation of v2) from the high-end product equal to his utility from the low-end
product.
For the purpose of extracting insights, we suppose that the ﬁrm operates in a perfect capital market
(Besanko and Winston, 1990), i.e. the ﬁrm and the consumer have the same rate of discounting (cs ¼ cc ¼ c,
ls ¼ lc ¼ l). While the model analysis can be carried out in the non-capital market case, it is tedious and
results in cumbersome expressions. We discuss the case of non-capital markets in Section 3 for speciﬁc
conditions on valuations. Under this assumption, the optimal values of q1 and q2 are given by
q1 ¼ v1
2c
 v2  v1
2c
1 F ðv2Þ
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ ; q2 ¼
v2
2c
This gives us
Pðq; vÞ ¼ c
4c
½v2F ðv2Þ  v1F ðv1Þ  ðv2  v1Þ2
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ þ
l
4c
v22½1 F ðv2Þ ð5Þ
Eq. (5) can also be equivalently re-written as:
Pðq; vÞ ¼ c½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þcq21 þ l½1 F ðv2Þcq22 ð6Þ
Equation (6) gives us some interesting insights. The ﬁrst and second terms represent the proﬁt from the low-
end and high-end segments, respectively. Note how the un-discounted proﬁt from each segment equals
the cost of goods sold to that segment (or the product of the size of the segment and the unit variable cost).
The boundary valuations v1 and v2 are as in Result 1.
Result 1
The optimal values of v1 and v2 are given by
v1 ¼
2
r1
 2
r2
c
l
1 F ðv2Þ
1 F ðv1Þ
ð7Þ
v2 ¼
2
r1
 2
r2
c
l
1þ F ðv1Þ  2F ðv2Þ
1 F ðv1Þ
ð8Þ
where
r1 ¼ f ðv

1Þ
1 F ðv1Þ
and r2 ¼ f ðv

2Þ
1 F ðv2Þ
:
The proof of Result 1 is based on the method used in Moorthy and Png (1992) and is provided in the
appendix, which is available with the authors. It is interesting to note that the expressions for r1 and r2 are
the hazard rates of the valuation function f evaluated at points v1 and v

2 respectively.
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If the ﬁrm introduces only a single product, the problem can be analyzed similarly to obtain p ¼ vq,
q ¼ v=2c, and v ¼ ð2=rÞ. Comparing the optimal valuations for the single product with that of the two
product case (obtained in Result 1), we see that v1 < v
 < v2 for all distributions of f ðvÞ, as expected.
Result 1 reveals a number of interesting aspects of the two-product planning problem. The boundary
market valuations v1 and v

2 are determined by a combination of the hazard rates and the market segments
for the two products. It is interesting to note that the optimal market segment for the single product
problem is given by v ¼ ð2=rÞ where r is the hazard rate at v. In this case, the hazard function at v is an
indicator of the density of consumers per unit market potential with valuations higher than v. This result is
similar to results in renewal theory, in that a high-end product is introduced when the remaining market for
the low-end product tends to result in lower margins. 3
3.2. Analytical solution for uniformly distributed consumer valuations
In the last section, we considered the case of general distributions of consumer valuations and derived
expressions for optimal prices and performance levels. Now, we consider the special case when consumer
valuations are uniformly distributed, and obtain closed-form expressions for the optimal performance
qualities, prices, and market segment boundaries. The uniform case has been used by other researchers in
the literature to derive insights (Besanko and Winston, 1990; Dhebar, 1994), and is particularly suitable
when the consumer distribution along the performance space cannot be predicted exactly (due to non-
informative priors). For the sake of generality, we let the upper bound of the uniform distribution to be a
parameter U (instead of constraining it to 1).
3.2.1. Credible announcement can be made
The optimal performance levels, prices and market segments are provided in Result 2. The results for
perfectly capital markets are obtained simply by equating the consumer and ﬁrm discounting factors.
Result 2
Case 1: Under simultaneous introduction of the two products, the optimal performance levels are given
by q1 ¼ ð0:2=cÞU and q2 ¼ ð0:4=cÞU . The values of the marginal valuations of the consumer segments are
given by v1 ¼ 0:6U and v2 ¼ 0:8U .
Case 2: When the two products are introduced in an increasing order of performance, the optimal
performance levels are given by
q1 ¼
v1  dsdc ðU  v2Þ
2c
and q2 ¼ v2
2c
where v1 and v2 are the values of the marginal valuations of the consumer segments are given by
v1 ¼ 1
3
2

 ds
dc

v2 þ dsdc U

and
v2 ¼
8ðds=dcÞð1þ ds=dcÞ2  18ds 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½8ðds=dcÞð1þ ds=dcÞ2  18ds2  16ðd2s=d2cÞð1þ dc=dsÞ½4ð1þ ds=dcÞ3  27ds
q
8ð1þ ds=dcÞ3  54ds
U
3 It is interesting to note that if the valuation function was distributed exponentially with f ðxÞ ¼ ex, then the hazard rate is equal to
1 for all values of x, since 1 F ðxÞ ¼ ex. Therefore, for the exponential distribution, we get v1 ¼ 1:6, v2 ¼ 3:2, q1 ¼ 0:6=c and
q2 ¼ 1:6=c in the simultaneous introduction case. If the ﬁrm were to introduce a single product, the ﬁrm would introduce it with a
quality of q ¼ 1=c and all consumers with vP 2 would purchase the product.
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Case 3: When the two products are introduced in a decreasing order of performance, the optimal per-
formance levels are given by
q1 ¼
v1  dcds ðU  v2Þ
2c
and q2 ¼ v2
2c
where v1 and v2 are the values of the marginal valuations of the consumer segments are given by
v1 ¼ 1
3
2

 dc
ds

v2 þ dcds U

and
v2 ¼
8dcð1þ dc=dsÞ2  18
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
½8dcð1þ dc=dsÞ2  182  16ðd2c=dsÞð1þ dc=dsÞ½4dsð1þ dc=dsÞ3  27
q
8dsð1þ dc=dsÞ3  54
U
The role of discounting in aﬀecting the decisions of the ﬁrm are well-known, in this case, consumer dis-
counting serves a dual purpose. It models the pace of technological evolution, and it also models the inter-
temporal utility preferences of consumers (Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Peart, 2000).
An interesting implication of the above result is that introducing a two-product family in an upward or
downward sequential order may, for some consumer and ﬁrm discount factors, result in lower proﬁts than
the introduction of a single product. This constrains the domain of existence of the sequentially upward and
downward introduction approaches. (The proﬁts accruing from the simultaneous introduction of two products
are always higher than that of a single product, so the simultaneous approach is viable for all values of the
discount factors.) The sequentially upward and downward introduction approaches may lead to lower
proﬁts than a single product for the following reasons. If ﬁrms are much more impatient than their cus-
tomers (ds < 2dc), then introducing products in a decreasing sequence of performance causes the extra
proﬁt from the low-end product to be lower than the reduction in proﬁt of the high-end product due to
cannibalization. Similarly, if the ﬁrm introduces two products in a market where customers are very im-
patient (dc < 0:6), then customers will not wait for the high-end product, so the cannibalization of proﬁts of
the high end product are greater than the extra proﬁts from the low-end product, lowering the total proﬁt to
the ﬁrm.
The discounting rates where the strategies of sequential upward introduction and sequential downward
introduction are viable are plotted below in Fig. 4. The simultaneous approach is not shown in the ﬁgure as
it can be used for all values of ds and dc.
By comparing the proﬁts from each of the three introduction sequences, we may determine the regions
where each of the three strategies are optimal (shown in Fig. 5).
The cost coeﬃcient c appears in the denominators of both the optimal performance levels q1 and q2, and
the prices p1 and p2, but not in the numerators, hence the comparison of proﬁts of all three strategies are
independent of c. An exhaustive numerical comparison along the two dimensions ds and dc, for all three
introduction strategies are shown in Fig. 5.
As can be seen from Fig. 5, the optimality regions of the three introduction approaches depends only on
the relative and absolute discounting rates of the ﬁrm and the consumer. The following observations can be
made from Fig. 5.
(a) When both the ﬁrm and the customers are relatively impatient (low and medium values of ds and dc),
but the ﬁrm is either more impatient than the customer, or a little more patient (ds  dc), introducing a
product family simultaneously is optimal.
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(b) When customers are much more impatient than the ﬁrm (ds  dc), and both the ﬁrm and customers are
relatively impatient (low and medium values of ds and dc), sequentially downward introduction is op-
timal.
(c) When both the ﬁrm and the customers are relatively patient (ds, dc > 0:889, as described by the shape of
the region in Fig. 4), sequentially upward introduction is optimal.
As stated before, the observations are based on a numerical comparison of the proﬁts from the three
diﬀerent launch sequences for diﬀerent values of ds and dc. The appropriateness of the three introduction
approaches can be interpreted as follows.
• If consumers are quite willing to wait for the product and the ﬁrm is willing to wait for future cash ﬂows,
introducing products in an increasing order is optimal. This is because the advancement of cash ﬂows
Fig. 4. Discount rates for which sequential upward and downward strategies can exist.
Fig. 5. Optimality of diﬀerent sequences.
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from the low-end product outweighs the reduced proﬁt from the high-end product due to cannibaliza-
tion.
• If the ﬁrm is substantially more patient than consumers, then it should adopt sequentially downward in-
troduction. Since customers are impatient, the proﬁts from the high-end product which is introduced
earlier is substantially higher, as the low-end product does not cannibalize the proﬁts from the high-
end product. The ﬁrm is also more willing to wait for proﬁts to accrue from the low-end product.
• When both the ﬁrm and consumers are impatient, but consumers are not signiﬁcantly more impatient
than the ﬁrm, then simultaneous introduction is more appropriate. It is superior to sequentially upward
introduction as consumers are not willing to wait for the high-end product, and the cannibalization of
proﬁts from the high-end product would be high in this case. Sequential downward introduction is also
suboptimal because the ﬁrm is not willing to wait for the proﬁts from the low-end product. Therefore,
introducing the products simultaneously becomes optimal. Our results are diﬀerent from the existing
literature since we show that the sequential upward strategy is optimal when there are constraints
on the period in which the high-end product can be oﬀered, hence the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it optimal to
introduce the low-end product ﬁrst, and get immediate proﬁts, even at the expense of a higher degree
of cannibalization. Our results complement those of Moorthy and Png (1992), since we show that using
continuous distributions, we can model heterogeneity in the market (modeled by the factor ‘‘R’’ in
Moorthy and Png, 1992), and based on the distribution of consumer valuations (using Result 1), we
can obtain insights into the optimal positioning and segmentation strategy to be used by the ﬁrm.
The perfectly eﬃcient capital markets case (ds ¼ dc ¼ d) can be analyzed similarly, so we provide the
results.
Simultaneous introduction (same as above):
q1 ¼ 0:2c U ; q2 ¼
0:4
c
U ; v1 ¼ 0:6U ; v2 ¼ 0:8U
Sequentially upward introduction:
q1 ¼ 6d 4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d2  8d
p
ð64 54dÞc U ; q2 ¼
16 9d 3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d2  8d
p
ð64 54dÞc U
v1 ¼ 32 24d 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d2  8d
p
64 54d U and v2 ¼
32 18d 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d2  8d
p
64 54d U
Sequentially downward introduction:
q1 ¼ 6 4
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d 8d2
p
ð64d 54Þc U ; q2 ¼
16d 9 3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d 8d2
p
ð64d 54Þc U
v1 ¼ 32d 24 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d 8d2
p
64d 54 U ; v2 ¼
32d 18 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
9d 8d2
p
64d 54 U
It is interesting to note that in eﬃcient capital markets, with a two-product portfolio, for all the three
approaches v1 > 0:5, or more than half the market is not oﬀered a product. This is because serving con-
sumers with lower valuation forces the ﬁrm to lower performance quality and consequently, the price and
the margin of the lower end product. Therefore, the ﬁrm chooses to ‘‘skim’’ the market rather than attempt
to gain a larger market share. The domains of optimality in capital markets simplify greatly. In particular,
simultaneous introduction is optimal for d < 27=32, sequentially downward introduction is optimal for
27=326 d6 8=9, and sequentially upward introduction is optimal for d > 8=9.
S. Bhattacharya et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 149 (2003) 102–130 113
3.2.2. Development sequence and performance with no credible signal possible
The case where the ﬁrm may not be able to provide a credible announcement to the market can be
analyzed in a similar fashion. We assume that in this case, consumers do not anticipate the ﬁrms future
oﬀerings, and hence, purchase products that give them positive surplus utilities as soon as they are avail-
able. Since it may often be the case that consumers may not trust the ﬁrms announcement (the case of
vaporware in software industries are an example where the signals sent by ﬁrms are not trusted) and buy the
products available in the market at that moment to be able to maximize their utilities, the ﬁrm has to react
accordingly in their product positioning strategy. The following result provides the optimal performance
levels, and cutoﬀ valuations when no commitment is possible.
Result 3
Case 1: Simultaneous introduction (same as above):
q1 ¼ 0:2c U ; q2 ¼
0:4
c
U ; v1 ¼ 0:6U ; v2 ¼ 0:8U
Case 2: Sequentially upward introduction:
q1 ¼ 1
3c
U ; v1 ¼ 2
3
U
the second product is not oﬀered.
Case 3: Sequentially downward introduction:
q1 ¼ 1
9
2
 2d
3
 
c
U ; q2 ¼ 1
3 4d
9
 
c
U v1 ¼ 19
4
 d
3
U ; v2 ¼ 13
2
 2d
9
U
• For the case of simultaneous introduction, since both the products are being launched at the same time
into the market, the lack of a credible signal (no commitment) does not make a diﬀerence, as the cus-
tomers can self-select the product with the higher surplus. Hence, the performance quality levels are
the same as in the previous subsection, this strategy is the same in the cases of credible and non-credible
signals (commitment and no-commitment).
• For the case of sequential upward introduction, since customers do not take a signal to be credible,
we see that all customers with positive surplus (vq > p) buy the low-end product in the ﬁrst period,
hence, the ﬁrm will not introduce the high-end product, as the entire market has bought the low-end
product. Hence, the ﬁrm introduces only one product, which corresponds to the one-product case in Sec-
tion 2.
• For the case of sequential downward introduction, the ﬁrm introduces the high-end product in the sec-
ond period and the low-end product in the third period. This strategy is viable, since the high-end prod-
uct is bought by all customers with non-negative surpluses from the product. In the third period, all
customers with non-negative surpluses from the low-end product will buy it. Hence, in a market where
it is diﬃcult to send a credible signal (no commitment), the simultaneous introduction strategy is the
best, followed by the sequentially downward introduction strategy. The sequential upward introduction
strategy fails in such a market, as the eﬀect of cannibalization reduces the fraction of the market for the
high-end product to zero. It is interesting to note that for all the three introduction strategies, the re-
newal property of the market can be used gainfully, as the remaining market for the low-end prod-
uct consists of all consumers whose reservation prices (valuation times performance quality level) is
lower than the price of the high-end product as in Besanko and Winston (1990). However, they
look at the case of pricing a single product over time to reveal skimming strategies, whereas we study
the pricing strategy for two products which are diﬀerentiated in performance levels, and introduced se-
quentially.
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We now extend the analysis of this section to two important special cases (i) consumer is oﬀered the
option of upgrading to the high-end product, and (ii) the ﬁrm faces competition.
3.3. The eﬀect of the upgrade option on the strategy of sequential upward introduction
We begin by analyzing the eﬀect of oﬀering the consumer the option to upgrade from the low-end
product introduced in the earlier period to the high-end product in the later period. 4 The option to upgrade
to the high-end product in the later period has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ﬁrms product positioning and
launch decisions. First, it alleviates consumer anxiety over locking into the low-end product in the earlier
period under sequentially upward introduction. Consumers with high valuations can ﬁrst purchase the low-
end product in the earlier period, and then upgrade to the high-end product in the next period. The upgrade
option increases the utility to consumers with high valuations, as they now derive utility from the products
in both periods. The ﬁrm gains from the upgrade option, as the low-end product has a higher demand. In
addition to consumers with low valuations who derive a non-negative utility from the low-end product,
consumers with high valuations also purchase the product. To capture these eﬀects in our model, we make
appropriate changes to the model of upward sequential development that was described in Section 3.1.
3.3.1. Upgrade option with credible signal
In this section, we assume that the ﬁrm can issue a credible signal to the market that a high-end product
will be provided later and the consumers can upgrade to the high-end product in the next period. Since the
upgrade option provides a suitable mechanism for consumers to avoid the lock-in problem, the market
segments are deﬁned somewhat diﬀerently from the previous sections. The participation and self-selection
constraints must be changed to ﬁnd the market for the low-end product and the upgrade. Consumers fall in
three segments: those selecting only the low-end product only, only the high-end product, or the low-end
product in the ﬁrst period and the upgrade in the next period. This results in somewhat counter-intuitive
market segments.
Result 4
Oﬀering the upgrade option under sequentially upward introduction creates three market segments (see
Fig. 6). Consumers with valuations between v1 and v2 purchase only the low-end product, consumers with
valuations from v2 to vu purchase only the high-end product, while consumers with valuations from vu to 1
purchase the low-end product in the ﬁrst period, and upgrade to the high-end product in the subsequent
period.
The reasoning for this result is as follows. It is evident that consumers with valuations between v1 and v2
will purchase the low-end product only, as they have low valuations for performance and do not have a
positive surplus from purchasing the high-end product. What is interesting is the structure of the other two
segments, especially the fact that the people with the highest valuations would choose the upgrade option.
Consumers with intermediate valuations (between v2 and vU ) have valuations that are high enough to gain
the maximum surplus from buying the high-end product in the second period, but their valuations of
performance are not high enough to justify purchasing the low-end product in the ﬁrst period as well.
Consumers with the highest valuations per unit of performance quality (between vU and 1), on the other
hand, enjoy the highest surplus from purchasing the low-end product in the ﬁrst period and upgrading to
the high-end product in the second period.
4 Note that the possibility of upgrading exists only if the ﬁrms follows the strategy of upward sequential introduction. If the ﬁrm
oﬀers both products simultaneously, consumers have access to the high-end product at the same time that they have access to the low-
end product. If the ﬁrm follows the strategy of downward sequential introduction, the higher-end product is introduced ﬁrst, so that
consumers who buy the lower-end product in the later period do so in spite of having the higher-end product available to them in the
second period.
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The objective function under the upgrade option will contain proﬁts from the low-end product segment
only (from v1 to v2), the high-end product segment only (from v2 to vU ), and the upgrade segment (from vU
to 1, who purchase the low-end product in the ﬁrst period, and the high-end product in the next period).
The problem is formally stated as Problem UP.
Problem UP
MaxP ¼ ðv2  v1 þ 1 vU Þðp1  cq21Þ þ dð1 vU ÞfpU  ðcq22  cq21 þ mq2  mq1Þg þ dðvU  v2Þ
 ðp2  cq22Þ
s.t.
vq1  p1 ¼ 0 v ¼ v1 ð9Þ
vq1  p1 ¼ dðvq2  p2Þ v ¼ v2 ð10Þ
ðvq1  p1Þ þ dfvðq2  q1Þ  pUg ¼ dðvq2  p2Þ v ¼ vU ð11Þ
vq1  p1 P 0 v16 v < v2 ð12Þ
vðq2  q1Þ  pU P 0 vU 6 v < 1 ð13Þ
vq2  p2 P 0 v26 v < vU ð14Þ
The ﬁrst term in the proﬁt maximization formulation represents the proﬁts from the sales of the low-end
product, the second term represents the proﬁts from the sale of the upgrade, and the third term represents
the proﬁts from the high-end product sales. Here, pU is the price of the upgrade, the term cq22  cq21þ
mq2  mq1 is the unit cost of the upgrade to the ﬁrm. The term cq22  cq21 models the diﬀerence in unit costs
between the two products, and the term mq2  mq1 models the additional cost of upgrading. Eqs. (9)–(11)
state the conditions for marginal consumers at v1, v2 and vU . Eq. (9) states that the consumer with a val-
uation of v1 is indiﬀerent between not buying at all and buying only the low-end product. Eq. (10) ensures
that the consumer with a valuation of v2 is indiﬀerent between buying only the low-end product and only
the high-end product. Eq. (11) ensures likewise that the consumer with a valuation of vU is indiﬀerent
between buying only the high-end product, and resorting to the upgrade option. Constraints 12–14 are the
participation constraints for the consumers in these three segments.
Proposition 1. If the discounting rate is high, then more customers prefer to upgrade rather than purchase the
high-end product only in the second period. If the discounting rate is low, then more customers prefer to buy the
high-end product only in the second period. The profits from the upgrade option always dominate the profits
without the upgrade option.
It is intuitive that if the ﬁrm can oﬀer an upgrade, consumers are not wary of getting locked into the
lower-end product. A larger number of consumers are willing to purchase the lower-end product, as they
can enjoy the beneﬁts of the high-end product too by upgrading later. The margin of the upgrade is lower
than the margin of the high-end product in the no-upgrade case, but this is more than compensated for by
the higher sales volume of the low-end product to the upgrading consumers resulting in higher proﬁt. It is
Fig. 6. Market segmentation for sequentially upward introduction with upgrade.
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also interesting to note that the firm will introduce an upgrade even if d is very low. 5 In this case, the market
for the high-end product only (v2 to vU ) is higher. The value of q1 and v1 is lower here than in the no-upgrade
case to reduce the unit variable cost of the low-end product. Since v1 is lower, the total market coverage
is higher because of the upgrade option. The value of q2 is lower so that a significant fraction of consumers
who purchased the low-end product can upgrade to the high-end product. As expected, the total market for
the high-end product (i.e., those who purchase the high-end product only, and those who upgrade to the high-
end product) is higher than the no-upgrade case. The proﬁts when the ﬁrm oﬀers the upgrade option always
dominates the proﬁts for the three previous cases, because of the higher market volume and low-
discounting associated with the low-end product. The advantage of oﬀering the upgrade option is thus a
higher market share, and an early accrual of proﬁts from the low-end product.
3.3.2. Upgrade case with no credible signal possible
If the market will not accept any signal from the ﬁrm about committing to an upgrade later, we see that
introducing an upgrade is still proﬁtable. If the ﬁrm introduces a low-end product in the ﬁrst period, then
all customers with non-negative surpluses will buy the low-end product in the ﬁrst period itself, and will not
postpone their purchase for a better product in the second period. Hence, we will only have two classes of
customers: those who buy the low-end product in the ﬁrst period, and those who upgrade to the high-end
product in the second period.
Proposition 2. If the firm cannot make a credible announcement about the launch of an upgrade, the sequential
upward strategy is still optimal, and dominates the sequential downward and simultaneous introduction
strategies with no commitment.
The proof of the proposition is in the appendix, we present the intuition here. Since there cannot be a
credible signal issued by the ﬁrm, all customers with a non-negative surplus will purchase the low-end
product. However, that increases the proﬁts of the ﬁrm compared to the previous case with commitment, as
it can extract out all the surpluses from the consumers, the consumers suﬀer the eﬀects of the lack of a
credible commitment in this case. This shows that in the absence of a credible commitment by the ﬁrm, the
upgrading option is the best option available to the ﬁrm. As seen in both Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, the
sequential upward strategy with the upgrade option always dominates the simultaneous introduction
strategy and the strategy of sequential downward introduction. The upgrade option gives ﬂexibility in
choice to both the ﬁrm and the consumers. The upgrade option provides the ﬁrm a less costly way of
making new products, as the entire product does not have to be introduced again, however, the ﬁrm can
extract a higher fraction of the surplus from providing a higher performance level to the consumer. Sim-
ilarly, t provides the consumer with the ﬂexibility of being able to enjoy the higher utility from the high-end
product when it is released later, and the early utility from the low-end product, which the consumer prefers
if s/he is impatient. Garud and Kumaraswamy (1993) provide a framework which shows that by adopting
open systems, most ﬁrms in the technology markets take advantage of the upgrade option by providing
consumers with a series of products, which have a high degree of commonality, and hence can be upgraded.
This enables the ﬁrm to get a higher market share, as demonstrated in this paper, and additionally, makes
the ﬁrm more capable of rapid innovation. We now analyze the impact of competition on the choice of
introduction sequence of the ﬁrm.
5 If d is very low, most of the consumers will purchase only the low-end product, but there will be a few high-end consumers who still
adopt the upgrade since it gives them more utility. As d tends to zero, the value of v1 tends to 0.666, the optimal v for a single product.
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3.4. Impact of competition on product family development planning: Two-product case
In this section, we analyze the impact of a competitive environment on the positioning, segmentation,
and introduction sequence of two products. We analyze a duopolistic scenario using a game-theoretic
framework, in which two ﬁrms commit to develop each of the two diﬀerentiated products. First, we analyze
the case where the ﬁrm can issue a credible announcement in Section 3.4.1, followed by the case where a
credible signal cannot be issued in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.1. Product positioning and market segmentation under competition when a credible signal can be issued
In this section, we conduct a game-theoretic analysis of a duopoly situation and derive insights
into the positioning, introduction sequence and market segmentation strategies of two ﬁrms that introduce
one of the two products. The two ﬁrms (labeled 1 and 2) choose their respective price and performance
levels to determine their relative positions in the market. The results obtained are compared to the base
case, which is the monopolist with the corresponding two-product introduction strategy.
Without loss of generality, suppose ﬁrm 1 commits to developing the low-end product, and ﬁrm 2
commits to developing the high-end product. Let ﬁrm is product be oﬀered at a performance quality of qi
and a price of pi. The objectives of the two ﬁrms, to maximize their own proﬁt from their respective
products, is as follows:
Firm1MaxP1 ¼ cðv2  v1Þðp1  cq21Þ; Firm2MaxP2 ¼ lð1 v2Þðp2  cq22Þ:
For ease of analysis, we again assume a perfectly eﬃcient capital market, i.e., the customers and the ﬁrm
have the same discounting rate, d, c and l are the discounting factors for the diﬀerent sequences, e.g. for the
simultaneous introduction case, c ¼ l ¼ d, and for the sequential upward introduction case, c ¼ 1, l ¼ d.
The self-selection and participation constraints are the same as those in the simultaneous introduction
model. Speciﬁcally, the marginal consumers will have valuations of v1 and v2 such that p1 ¼ v1q1 and
p2 ¼ v2q2  ðc=lÞðv2  v1Þq1. To ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium in prices for the two ﬁrms in this non-cooper-
ative game, we solve the equations ðoPi=opiÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2; simultaneously for both ﬁrms. The optimal
prices are presented in Result 4 in the appendix. The Nash equilibrium prices are substituted back into P1
and P2 to obtain the optimal performance levels of the two products. The eﬀect of competition on the
introduction sequence, prices, performance levels, and the respective market segment sizes of the low-end
and high-end products are discussed in the proposition below.
Proposition 3. In the presence of competition, for all three introduction sequences, the optimal price of the low-
end product decreases (relative to the monopolist case), while the optimal price of the high-end product in-
creases. The market share of the low-end product is higher, while the market share of the high-end product
decreases slightly. The firm producing the low-end product has the highest profits from the sequential upward
introduction case (when it introduces the product in the first period and the other firm introduces the high-end
product in the next period).
For the simultaneous introduction case, the optimal prices, performance levels, and marginal consumer
valuations are given by
p1 ¼ 0:109c ; q1 ¼
0:2473
c
; v1 ¼ 0:4404; P1 ¼ 0:0173c
and
p2 ¼ 0:335c ; q2 ¼
0:528
c
; v2 ¼ 0:8032; P2 ¼ 0:0109c :
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The proposition is proved in the Appendix, the intuition is presented here. As expected, the optimal
performance levels are higher for both products in the competitive case, which corroborates the existing
theory. Also, the price of the low-end product is lower, because even though the unit cost of production has
increased, competition forces ﬁrm 1 to charge a lower price. In doing so, ﬁrm 1 gains a larger market share,
as a larger fraction of consumers in the market can now purchase the low-end product (as the surplus is
positive for consumers with lower valuations. The total sales from both products put together increases
under competition. Therefore, ﬁrm 1 competes on the basis of volume, i.e., it has a lower margin, but a
market share of nearly 36% (compared to the 20% share in the corresponding monopolistic case) com-
pensating for the lower margin.
The performance level of the high-end product has to be signiﬁcantly increased under competition, to
distinguish itself from the low-end product. This increases the unit variable cost of the high-end product (as
the unit cost is of the form cq2). The price charged has to be higher to compensate for this disproportionate
increase in the unit variable cost. Since both the performance and price increase, ﬁrm 2 has about the same
market share as in the monopolistic case. Surprisingly, the proﬁts attained by ﬁrm 1 are higher than the
proﬁts attained by ﬁrm 2, unlike in the monopolistic case, where the high-end product has a greater
contribution to the proﬁts than the low-end product. The high-end product has to be substantially dif-
ferentiated (has a higher unit variable cost), and hence has a low margin, while the volume for the product
stays almost the same. This causes the decrease in proﬁts. This eﬀect is strengthened when the low-end
product is introduced in the ﬁrst period and the high-end product is introduced in the next period. Some
impatient customers who would have bought the high-end product if it were available will now buy the low-
end product as they derive higher discounted utility from the low-end product. The low-end product will
never be introduced after the high-end product if ﬁrm 1 has the technology available, as the proﬁts from
sequential downward introduction are the lowest for ﬁrm 1 of the three introduction sequence cases. This
reinforces the intuition that in a competitive environment, a ﬁrm that has the low-end product introduces it
ﬁrst to preempt the other player.
3.4.2. Product positioning and market segmentation with no credible signal in competition
If the ﬁrm cannot issue a credible signal about introducing a product in the future in the market, then
only the simultaneous introduction and sequentially downward strategies can exist in equilibrium. To see
why, note that if the low-end product is introduced in the market ﬁrst, then no one will buy the high-end
product later, as customers just buy one product, since they do not believe that there will be a better
product later, customers will choose to adopt the low-end product when it is available. If the products are
introduced simultaneously by the two competitors, then the results from the previous section will still hold,
since the customers can self-select the product of their own choice immediately. For the sequential
downward introduction case, ﬁrm 2 introduces the high-end product in period 2, followed by the intro-
duction of the low-end product in period 3.
Proposition 4. If the firms cannot issue a credible signal to the customers about the time of introduction of
their products, then the results of Proposition 3 hold for the strategy of both firms introducing the products
simultaneously. If the low-end product is introduced first, then the second firm will not introduce the high-end
product later. If the high-end product is introduced first, it captures a higher fraction of the market than the
case with a credible signal. The low-end product is introduced later, and captures a lower fraction of the market
than the case with a credible signal.
The above results show that with no credible signal possible, ﬁrm 1 will try and introduce its product as
soon as possible, as it beneﬁts from locking out the competition by introducing the product ﬁrst. This
reinforces the results in the previous section, viz., by introducing a low-end product early in the market, the
ﬁrm can obtain higher proﬁts, as all customers adopt the low-end product immediately. If ﬁrm 1 does not
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have the technological capabilities that ﬁrm 2 has, then it is possible that ﬁrm 2 introduces the high-end
product ﬁrst, by which it gains market share compared to the low-end product. Even though the proﬁts for
ﬁrm 2 are higher in this strategy, ﬁrm 1 can still have positive proﬁts, as some consumers will wait and
adopt the low-end product since the price of the low-end product is lower.
We now present a conceptual framework for introduction sequence decision-making from the model
insights.
4. A conceptual framework for the model insights
The model presented in the previous sections helps derive analytical expressions for product positioning,
market segmentation, and proﬁt from each introduction sequence for a ﬁrm experiencing concurrent de-
velopment of core technology. In this section, we translate the model ﬁndings into a conceptual framework
that presents managerial insights. Fig. 7 presents the regions of appropriateness of each of the diﬀerent
introduction sequences.
Moorthy and Png (1992) showed that in the absence of exogenous technological improvement, simul-
taneous and downward sequential introduction dominate the upward sequential introduction approach.
Our major contribution is to show that upward sequential introduction can be optimal in a variety of cir-
cumstances when the operational issues of concurrent product and technology development are modeled. In
particular, if the ﬁrm can make a credible announcement about the relative performance of the products
and when both the ﬁrm and the consumer have about the same discount factors and are both more patient,
the upward sequential introduction approach dominates simultaneous and downward sequential intro-
duction approaches. Part of the reason is the early accrual of proﬁts from the low-end product. More
importantly, following the upward sequential strategy enables the ﬁrm to deliver the best possible product
when it is available, resulting in higher margins for the high-end product.
When the ﬁrm and consumers become more impatient, simultaneous and downward sequential intro-
duction approaches become more viable. These strategies are also better when the ﬁrm cannot make a
credible commitment about the relative performances of the products, as the high-end product will not be
adopted if the ﬁrm adopts the upward sequential strategy. In particular, when the ﬁrm and the consumers
discount beneﬁts rapidly, the simultaneous introduction strategy is the most eﬀective. The downward se-
quential introduction approach is optimal for medium values of discounting, as it enables the ﬁrm to post
greater proﬁts on the high-end product. Consumers are willing to wait to some extent for the low-end
product in the later period. Clearly, the cost of cannibalization is also the lowest in this case (Moorthy and
Png, 1992), so, a high degree of cannibalization favors the downward sequential strategy.
Fig. 7. Comparison of diﬀerent introduction approaches.
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When the ﬁrm oﬀers consumers the option of upgrading to the high-end product at the end of the
second period, the upward sequential strategy becomes optimal in a larger number of situations. The
option of upgrading to the high-end product oﬀers an incentive to consumers with very high valuations to
purchase the low-end product and purchase the upgrade when it becomes available. When the ﬁrm
can issue a credible commitment about the relative performances of products, the ﬁrm gets a higher
market share for the low-end product, as the price of the low-end product is reduced, and in the second
period, gets a signiﬁcant market share for the upgrade. The upgrade option also enables the ﬁrm to reduce
the cost of cannibalization of sales in the upward sequential approach, making it more attractive. When
the ﬁrm cannot issue a credible signal, the upward sequential approach with the upgrade option is still
more attractive, as all consumers adopt the low-end product, and the ﬁrm does not have to reduce the
price of the low-end product signiﬁcantly. The upgrade high-end product is then purchased when it is
available, and since the quality of the upgrade is higher, the ﬁrm can extract a higher margin. Surpris-
ingly, in this case, the lack of a credible signal helps the ﬁrm extract the maximum surplus from the
consumers.
The game-theoretic model of competition helps understand the eﬀect of competition on product per-
formance levels and prices. A summary of the ﬁndings is presented in Fig. 8. When the competing ﬁrms can
issue a credible signal, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrm developing the low-end product must increase its performance
quality and decrease its price slightly compared to the monopoly case where both products are developed
by the same ﬁrm. In the Nash equilibrium, the high-end product has to diﬀerentiate itself signiﬁcantly in
terms of performance and price from the low-end product. Therefore, the competitive environment aﬀects
the ﬁrm with the high-end product much more signiﬁcantly than the ﬁrm with the low-end product.
Since the performance of the low-end product is substantially higher, and its price only slightly higher, it
enables more consumers with lower valuations to purchase the product. This gives the low-end product a
substantial increase in its market share at the cost of a small decrease in margin. The proﬁt of the low-end
product is therefore higher than the corresponding monopoly case. The margin of the high-end product is
substantially lower than in the monopoly case, and the market share decreases marginally. The proﬁt from
the high-end product in a competitive environment is, therefore, lower than that of the low-end product.
This eﬀect is stronger when the low-end product is introduced before the high-end product, as the canni-
balization of the high-end product is even higher due to delayed launch.
When the competing ﬁrms cannot issue a credible signal, we ﬁnd that both the ﬁrm developing the low-
end product will try to introduce it into the market as quickly as possible, so as to lock out the competition
from the market. All consumers will buy the low-end product, as they do not believe there will be better
products available later. When one ﬁrm has a superior technological capability, they may be able to in-
troduce a high-end product and get a substantial proﬁt from it, if the other ﬁrm cannot introduce a product
early. In this case, the ﬁrm with the low-end product can still introduce it later after the launch of the high-
end product, in this case, the low-end product has much lower proﬁts.
Fig. 8. Eﬀect of competition on the low and high-end products.
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The above observations can be illustrated with the product development eﬀort at a Fortune 100 tele-
communications company (‘‘study company’’). The development team that we interacted with at the study
company designs network testing sets that detect physical faults in telecom networks. Prior to telecom
deregulation in the United States, the study company worked with customers who had a virtual monopoly.
The pace of technological advancements was relatively slow, the ﬁrm and its customers were historically
more interested in minimizing cannibalization, they launched products in a decreasing order of perfor-
mance. Due to intensifying competition caused by telecom industry de-regulation and the rapid develop-
ment of core technologies such as digital signal processors, the eﬀects of technological advancements must
now be balanced with that of de-regulation.
We raised this issue with the team leader asking him if the downward sequential approach (of launching
products in a decreasing order of performance) was still appropriate for the companys new business en-
vironment. In our discussion, we learned that the increasing component of software and the use of elec-
tronic circuits called ﬁeld programmable gate arrays in the network testing kits made them more easily
upgradeable on the ﬁeld and more appealing to customers with potential (but not immediate) high-end
uses. Also, we pointed out to the study company that intensifying competition and the emphasis on
shareholder value creation made the discounting factor of both the ﬁrm and its customers high. Further, as
shown in Fig. 6, in a competitive environment greater share of proﬁts accrue from the low-end product and
if a competitor were to pre-empt the study company by introducing the low-end product, that would
signiﬁcantly cut into its life-cycle proﬁts. All the above factors argued for not delaying the introduction of
low-end products until the high-end product is launched. Using our insight model, we showed the team
leader how the ﬁrm could sustain its leadership if it introduced products in an increasing order of per-
formance and minimized cannibalization by oﬀering customers an upgrade path. The team leader pointed
out that the threat of cannibalization can be further managed/reduced through external diﬀerentiation in
form (using cheaper materials for housing etc.), and has expressed interest in adopting a upward sequential
approach for their forthcoming product launches.
We now present our conclusions from the study, and avenues for future research.
5. Discussions and conclusions
Our analysis in this paper indicates that in the presence of exogenous technological improvements,
launching products in an increasing order of performance can be not only proﬁtable but also even optimal
for a range of circumstances. In addition, if the ﬁrm oﬀers its consumers the option of upgrading to a high-
end product in a subsequent period, then the cost of cannibalization can be reduced and introducing
products in an increasing order of performance becomes even more appropriate. These ﬁndings add a new
dimension to the literature on positioning and introduction sequence of technology-based products.
In developing the model, we made several modeling assumptions, and we review the major assumptions
here. For instance, we have used a linear utility model to quantify customer surplus from a product, an
assumption that has also been used in the literature before (Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Spence, 1980). When
this assumption does not hold and the utility is a concave or convex function of the surplus, we can use
sensitivity analysis to determine the impact of the linearity assumption on the results of our model. It was
also assumed that the unit variable cost exhibits constant returns to scale and is a squared function of the
performance of the product. The quadratic form is only used to derive expressions for the optimal per-
formance levels and market segments, and the analysis of the model reveals similar insights for other
convex cost functions. We propose to investigate in future research the implication of scale and scope
economies in the cost function. Also, this paper does not include a term for development costs, but it may
be seen qualitatively that the eﬀect of a development cost term would be to reduce the gap between the
performance levels of succeeding products, thus increasing the cost of cannibalization.
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Our modeling and analysis of the product positioning and introduction sequence decisions has several
implications for product development practice. First, the need to develop products concurrently with the
underlying technology creates the setting where product positioning decisions must be made amidst
exogenous technology improvements. Under these conditions, introducing products as and when they are
available is an attractive approach when the cost of cannibalization is low or when the ﬁrm can oﬀer the
customer the option to upgrade to a higher performance product. Recent observations in the soft-
ware industry oﬀer evidence that other ﬁrms too might be using this approach to their advantage. For
instance, in the web-browser market, Microsoft and Netscape have increasingly resorted to the se-
quential upward approach to introducing their new products. In closing, this paper makes a contribu-
tion to the product development literature by drawing attention to the interactions between the product
being developed and its underlying technology. We also address the challenges facing the ﬁrm in
making product positioning and introduction sequence decisions amidst improvements in such core
technology.
Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Result 3
The proof follows from a numerical ordering of the surplus in utilities associated with speciﬁc options. If
a customer purchases the low-end product only, the surplus utility is given by
UðLow-end productÞ ¼ vq1  p1 ¼ q1v p1:
For customers who purchase the high-end product only,
UðHigh-end productÞ ¼ dðvq2  p2Þ ¼ dq2v dp2:
For customers who purchase the low-end product and then the upgrade to the high-end product,
UðLow-end productþUpgradeÞ ¼ vq1  p1 þ ð1 dÞ½vðq2  q1Þ  pU 
¼ ½ð1 dÞq1 þ dq2v p1  pU
From the above three surplus utility equations, we see that customers with higher valuations (Higher values
of v) derive greater surplus from the high-end product only compared to the low-end product only, and
from the (low-end productþ upgrade option compared to the high-end product only. Therefore, the or-
dering in Result 3 holds true. 
A.2. Proof of Result 1
We present the proof here for the case of simultaneous introduction of the products (c ¼ l). For the
other two cases, the proof is analogous. To ﬁnd the optimal values of q1 and q2, we substitute the optimal
prices back into the proﬁt function to obtain the following expression for the proﬁt:
P ¼ ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ½v1q1  cq21 þ ½1 F ðv2Þ½v2q2  ðv2  v1Þq1  cq22
This expression can be rearranged as follows to obtain the optimal values of q1 and q2.
P ¼ ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ v1q1

 ðv2  v1Þq1 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ  cq
2
1

þ ½1 F ðv2Þ½v2q2  cq22
The ﬁrst-order conditions give us the optimal values of quality for the low-end and high-end product re-
spectively.
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q1 ¼ 1
2c
v1

 ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ

and q1 ¼ v2
2c
:
Substituting the optimal qualities back into the expression for proﬁts, we obtain the following expression
for the proﬁts, which are only in terms of v1 and v2.
P ¼ ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
4c
v1

 ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
2
þ ½1 F ðv2Þ
4c
v22 ðA:1Þ
Since the marginal valuations vi and the prices pi are related in a linear fashion, P can be equivalently
optimized in terms of q and v, rather than for p and v, this has the added beneﬁt of simplifying the analysis.
The ﬁrst-order condition for v1 gives us
oP
ov1
¼ 0) ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ2 1
"
fF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þgf1 F ðv2Þg þ ðv2  v1Þf ðv1ÞfF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þg2
#
¼ f ðv1Þ v1

 ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ

This can be further simpliﬁed to:
2½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ þ 2½1 F ðv2Þ  2ðv2  v1Þf ðv1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
¼ v1f ðv1Þ  ðv2  v1Þf ðv1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
or
2½1 F ðv1Þ ¼ v1f ðv1Þ þ ðv2  v1Þf ðv1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ ;
which reduces to:
2
r1
¼ v1 þ ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ ðA:2Þ
Before applying the ﬁrst order condition for v2, transform Eq. (A.1) in the following manner.
P ¼ ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
4c
v1

 ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv2ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
2
þ ½1 F ðv2Þ
4c
v22 ðA:1Þ
4cP ¼ v21½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ  2v1ðv2  v1Þ½1 F ðv2Þ þ ðv2  v1Þ2
½1 F ðv2Þ2
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ þ ½1 F ðv2Þv
2
2
or
4cP ¼ v21½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ þ ðv22  2v1v2 þ 2v21Þ½1 F ðv2Þ þ ðv2  v1Þ2
½1 F ðv2Þ2
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
or
4cP ¼ v21½1 F ðv1Þ þ ðv2  v1Þ2½1 F ðv2Þ 1

þ 1 F ðv2Þ
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ

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or
4cP ¼ v21½1 F ðv1Þ þ ðv2  v1Þ2½1 F ðv1Þ
1 F ðv2Þ
F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ
 
The ﬁrst-order condition for this transformed expression with respect to v2 gives us
oP
ov2
¼ 0) ½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ½2ðv2  v1Þf1 F ðv2Þg  ðv2  v1Þ2f ðv2Þ ¼ ðv2  v1Þ2½1 F ðv2Þf ðv2Þ
or
2½F ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ½1 F ðv2Þ ¼ ðv2  v1Þf ðv2Þ½1 F ðv1Þ
The above expression reduces to
2
r2
¼ ðv2  v1Þ 1 F ðv1ÞF ðv2Þ  F ðv1Þ ðA:3Þ
Solving Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3) simultaneously gives us the result in Result 1. 
A.3. Proof of Result 2
We present the proof of the results in the simultaneous introduction case. The sequential upward and
sequential downward introduction cases follow analogously. The conditions for the utility of marginal
consumers gives p1 ¼ v1q1, and p2 ¼ v2q2  ðv2  v1Þq1. Using these prices in the proﬁt function, we obtain
v1 ¼ ðp1=q1Þ and v2 ¼ ðp2  p1Þ=ðq2  q1Þ. Substituting these values into the proﬁt function, we get
P ¼ p2  p1
q2  q1

 p1
q1

ðp1  cq21Þ þ 1

 p2  p1
q2  q1

ðp2  cq22Þ
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to p1 and p2 gives us
oP
op1
¼ 0) 1
q2  q1

 1
q1

ðp1  cq21Þ þ
p2  p1
q2  q1

 p1
q1

þ p2  cq
2
2
q2  q1 ¼ 0
which simpliﬁes to
2p2  2p1  cq22 þ cq21
q2  q1 ¼
2p1  cq21
q1
ðA:4Þ
oP
op2
¼ 0) p1  cq
2
1
q2  q1 
p2  cq22
q2  q1 þ 1
p2  p1
q2  q1 ¼ 0
which simpliﬁes to
2p2  2p1  cq22 þ cq21
q2  q1 ¼ 1 ðA:5Þ
From Eqs. (A.4) and (A.5), we ﬁnd p1 ¼ ðcq21 þ q1Þ=2 and p2 ¼ ðcq22 þ q2Þ=2. Substituting these optimal
prices back into the proﬁt function, we get
P ¼ cq2
2
q1  cq21
2
 
þ 1
2
½1 cðq1 þ q2Þ q2  cq
2
2
2
 
The ﬁrst-order condition for q1 gives us
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oP
oq1
¼ 0) cq2½1 2cq1  cðq2  cq22Þ ¼ 0 or q2 ¼ 2q1
The ﬁrst-order condition for q2 gives us
oP
oq2
¼ 0) cðq1  cq21Þ  cðq2  cq22Þ þ ½1 cðq1 þ q2Þ½1 2cq2 ¼ 0
or 3cq2 ¼ 1þ cq1 or q1 ¼ 0:2=c and q1 ¼ 0:4=c. The other parts of Result 2 follow. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by showing that constraints 12–14 are redundant because they are satisﬁed if constraints 9–11
are satisﬁed. From constraint 9, v1q1 ¼ p1. It follows that 12 is trivially satisﬁed, because vq1-p1 is greater
than zero if v is greater than v1. From constraint 10, v2q2  p2 ¼ ð1=dÞðv2q1  p1Þ ¼ ð1=dÞðv2  v1Þq1 > 0. It
follows that if v is greater than v2, then constraint 14 is satisﬁed. Similarly, given the linear ordering vU > v2,
13 is satisﬁed if 11 is satisﬁed.
We solve for the optimal values of p1, p2, v1, v2, q1, and q2 here in a similar fashion to the cases before by
solving for the prices using the utilities of the marginal consumers. Solving Eqs. (9)–(11) gives us
v1 ¼ p1q1 ; v2 ¼
dp2  p1
dq2  q1 ; vU ¼
p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ
Substituting the values of v1, v2 and vU in the proﬁt function, P can be rewritten as:
P ¼ dp2  p1
dq2  q1

 p1
q1

ðp1  cq21Þ þ d
p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ

 dp2  p1
dq2  q1

ðp2  cq22Þ
þ 1

 p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ

½p1  cq21 þ dfpU  ðcq22  cq21 þ mq2  mq1Þg
Applying the ﬁrst-order conditions for p1, p2, and pU , we get:
oP
op1
¼ 0
) 1
dq2  q1

 1
q1

ðp1  cq21Þ þ
dp2  p1
dq2  q1 
p1
q1
þ d 1
q1ð1 dÞ

þ 1
dq2  q1

ðp2  cq22Þ þ 1
 p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ 
1
q1ð1 dÞ ½p1  cq
2
1 þ dfpU  ðcq22  cq21 þ mq2  mq1Þg
¼ 0
This reduces to the condition:
2p1 þ 2dp2 þ cq21  dcq22
dq2  q1 þ
2p1 þ cq21
q1
þ 1þ 1
q1ð1 dÞ
 ½2p1 þ 2dp2  2dpU þ cq21ð1 dÞ þ dðmq2  mq1Þ
¼ 0 ðA:6Þ
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oP
op2
¼ 0
) 1
dq2  q1 ðp1  cq
2
1Þ þ d
1
q1ð1 dÞ

þ 1
dq2  q1

ðp2  cq22Þ þ
p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ 
dp2  p1
dq2  q1
þ 1
q1ð1 dÞ ½p1  cq
2
1 þ dfpU  ðcq22  cq21 þ mq2  mq1Þg
¼ 0
This reduces to the condition:
2p1  2dp2  cq21 þ dcq22
dq2  q1 þ
1
q1ð1 dÞ ½2p1  2dp2 þ 2dpU  cq
2
1ð1 dÞ  dðmq2  mq1Þ ¼ 0 ðA:7Þ
oP
opU
¼ 0) d
q1ð1 dÞ ðp2  cq
2
2Þ þ 1
p1 þ dpU  dp2
q1ð1 dÞ 
p1  cq21 þ dfpU  ðcq22  cq21 þ mq2  mq1Þg
q1ð1 dÞ
¼ 0
This reduces to the condition:
2p1  2dpU þ 2dp2 ¼ ðq1 þ cq21Þð1 dÞ þ dðmq2  mq1Þ ðA:8Þ
Substituting this result in (A.7), we get
2p1  cq21  2dp2 þ dcq22 ¼ dq2  q1
Substituting this result back in (A.6), we get
p1 ¼ cq
2
1 þ q1
2
; p2 ¼ cq
2
2 þ q2
2
; pU ¼ 1
2
ð1þ mÞðq2  q1Þ þ cq
2
2  cq21
2
and 14 are the participation constraints for the consumers in these three segments.
The optimal values of v1, v2 and vU are given by
v1 ¼ 1þ cq1
2
; v2 ¼ 1
2
þ dcq
2
2  cq21
2ðdq2  q1Þ ; vU ¼
1
2
þ cq1
2
þ dmðq2  q1Þ
2q1ð1 dÞ
The other parts of the result follow from here. These optimal prices are substituted back into the proﬁt
function to derive implicit equations for q1 and q2, which are then solved numerically for diﬀerent values
of d.
Proof of Proposition 2: Since consumers do not apply any foresight, all consumers who have a valuation
higher than v1 will purchase the low-end product in the ﬁrst period. In the second period, those consumers
who upgrade will do so iﬀ v2q2  pU P v2q1, i.e., they obtain a higher utility from the upgrade than the price
they pay for the upgrade. The ﬁrm will therefore, price the upgrade to make the above constraint hold at
equality, i.e., pU ¼ v2ðq2  q1Þ. Since the cost of the upgrade is cðq2  q1Þ2, in the second period, the ﬁrm
optimizes P2 ¼ ð1 v2Þ½pU  cðq2  q1Þ2. Substituting the value of the price into the proﬁt function, we see
that the cutoﬀ valuation v2 is given by q2 ¼ ðv2=2cÞ þ q1. Substituting back, we get P2 ¼ ð1 v2Þðv22=4cÞ. In
the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm optimizes the following program:
MaxP ¼ ð1 v1Þðp1  cq21Þ þ dP2
s:t: v1q1  p1 P 0
v16 v2
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Firm 1 sets p1 ¼ v1q1, and optimizes the proﬁts from the two periods. Since the proﬁts from the two periods
are temporally independent except for the constraint on v1, the two problems can be solved independently,
getting v1 ¼ v2 ¼ 0:67. Hence, all consumers who purchase the product in the ﬁrst period upgrade to the
high-end product in the second period. Hence, the ﬁrm can obtain proﬁts from the low-end and high-end
products without any loss in eﬃciency due to cannibalization. Comparing the proﬁts numerically for
diﬀerent values of d proves the proposition.
Result 4: In the simultaneous introduction case, the Nash equilibrium prices for the low-end product and
high-end product are:
p1 ¼ q1
4q2  q1 ½cq
2
2 þ 2cq1q2 þ q2  q1
p2 ¼ 2q2
4q2  q1 ½cq
2
2 þ 2cq1q2 þ q2  q1  cq1q2
In the sequential upward introduction case, the Nash equilibrium prices for the low-end product and high-
end product are:
p1 ¼ q1
4dq2  q1 ½dcq
2
2 þ 2dcq1q2 þ dq2  q1
p2 ¼ q2
4dq2  q1 ½2dcq
2
2 þ cq21 þ 2dq2  2q1
In the sequential downward introduction case, the Nash equilibrium prices for the low-end product and
high-end product are:
p1 ¼ q1
4q2  dq1 ½cq
2
2 þ 2dcq1q2 þ q2  dq1
p2 ¼ q2
4q2  dq1 ½2cq
2
2 þ dcq21 þ 2q2  2dq1 
A.5. Proof of Result 4
We present the case for the sequential upward introduction case, the proof for the other two cases is
analogous. Since v1q1 ¼ p1 and v2q2  p2 ¼ ð1=dÞðv2q1  p1Þ, it follows that v1 ¼ ðp1=q1Þ and v2 ¼ ðdp2
p1Þ=ðdq2  q1Þ. The two proﬁt functions are given by
P1 ¼ dp2  p1dq2  q1

 p1
q1

ðp1  cq21Þ; P2 ¼ d 1

 dp2  p1
dq2  q1

ðp2  cq22Þ
The ﬁrst-order condition of ðoP1=op1Þ ¼ 0 gives us
dp2  p1
dq2  q1 
p1
q1
¼ ðp1  cq21Þ
1
dq2  q1

þ 1
q1

and
oP2
op2
¼ 0
gives us
1 dp2  p1
dq2  q1 ¼ d
p2  cq22
dq2  q1
respectively. The two conditions reduce to
p2 ¼ q2q1 ð2p1  cq
2
1Þ; and 2dp2 ¼ p1 þ dcq22 þ dq2  q1
Solving these two linear equations simultaneously gives us the equations in Result 4. 
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A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
For the simultaneous introduction case, substituting the Nash equilibrium prices p1 and p2 back into the
proﬁt functions, we get:
P1 ¼ q1q2ðq2  q1Þ 1þ cq2  cq1
4q2  q1
 2
and
P2 ¼ ðq2  q1Þ 2q2  2cq
2
2  cq1q2
4q2  q1
 2
Diﬀerentiating P1 and P2 with respect to q1 and q2 gives us the following two equations:
ðq2  2q1Þð4q2  q1Þ½1þ cðq2  q1Þ  2q1ðq2  q1Þ½1 3cq2 ¼ 0
q2ð4q2  q1Þ½1 cðq2 þ q1
2
Þ þ ðq2  q1Þ½cq21  2q1ð1 2cq2Þ  8cq22 ¼ 0
Solving the above two equations simultaneously gives us the results of Proposition 3. For the sequential
upward introduction case, the two proﬁt functions are given by
P1 ¼ q1dq2ðdq2  q1Þð4dq2  q1Þ2
cðdq2

 q1Þ þ 1þ dð1 dÞcq
2
2
dq2  q1
2
P2 ¼ ðdq2  q1Þ2dq2  ð2dq2  q1Þdcq
2
2  dcq21q2
ð4dq2  q1Þ
2
ðdq2
"
 q1Þ
#
q2½2dq2  2q1  2dcq22 þ cq21 þ cq1q2
A numerical comparison of the proﬁts from the diﬀerent solutions dependent on d provides the results of
the proposition. 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4
For the sequential downward introduction case, the problem is speciﬁed as follows: Firm 2:
MaxP2 ¼ ð1 v2Þðp2  cq22Þ
v2q2  p2 P 0
Since customers do not have foresight, we get v2 ¼ ðp2=q2Þ from the constraint. Substituting this value in the
proﬁt function, we get v2 ¼ 0:67. The low-end product can then be sold potentially in third period to all
customers with valuations between 0 and 0.67. Hence, the problem for the low-end product is as follows:
Firm 1:
MaxP1 ¼ 2
3

 v1

ðp1  cq21Þ
v1q1  p1 P 0:
Solving for v1, we obtain v1 ¼ 0:44. The proﬁts for ﬁrm 2 from the high-end product are P2 ¼ 1=27c, while
the proﬁts for ﬁrm 1 from the low-end product are P1 ¼ 8=729c, which makes the high-end product more
proﬁtable.
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